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Schopenhauer’s Fictions
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Much has been written on the enormous influence of Arthur Schopen-
hauer’s philosophy on the writings of Jorge Luis Borges. Borges was a vo-
racious reader of Schopenhauer1 but, according to an interview with Jean 
de Milleret, he was not so much subscribing to Schopenhauer’s Idealist 
philosophy as looking for ways to use his ideas in his own literary work:
j’ai surtout songé aux possibilités littéraires de la philosophie idéaliste, 
disons, plutôt qu’à son bien-fondé. Cela ne signifie pas forcément que 
je croie à la philosophie de Berkeley ou de Schopenhauer du fait que j’ai 
utilisé leurs possibilités littéraires, ni que je les pratique, ni que je leur aie 
donné ma foi, ma conviction. (72)
This attitude with which Borges approaches Schopenhauer’s work already 
implies a critique—that, rather than offering truths about the real world, 
1 “El culto de Alemania se lo debo a Carlyle, pero yo decidí enseñarme ese idioma para 
leer en el original El mundo como voluntad y representación, de Schopenhauer, y también a 







Idealism presents a framework on which to construct fictional worlds.2 
But if we consider The World as Will and Idea as a philosophical fiction, then 
it is a fiction that is more logically perverse than any of Borges’s stories.
Many of Borges’s fictions conspicuously make use of Schopenhauer’s 
particular Idealist system, even going as far as referencing his ideas di-
rectly and having his characters reading Schopenhauer’s works. But on a 
structural level, his hypothetical worlds also show the influence of the log-
ical structures of Schopenhauer’s philosophical writings, which often use 
self-referentiality in order to create a discourse that doubles back on itself. 
One well-known example of this strategy, in Schopenhauer’s early work, 
can be found in The Fourfold Root of Reason, where he presents a proof of 
the principle of sufficient reason formulated as a piece of self-referential 
logic. This proof has been termed “Schopenhauer’s circle”:
The principle of sufficient reason is just the expression of this necessity of 
a reason or ground for every judgement. Now whoever requires a proof 
for this reason, already assumes thereby that it is true; in fact he bases his 
demand on this very assumption. He therefore finds himself in that circle 
of demanding a proof for the right to demand a proof. (Jacquette 57)
This circular sleight-of-hand, ingenious yet profoundly dissatisfying, calls 
to mind the same “double-decker, perverse, but logically perfect structure” 
that Stanislaw Lem deems to be the distinctive quality of Borges’s fictions 
(234). 
This meta-argumentative technique can be found in its fully devel-
oped form in Schopenhauer’s most exhaustive text, The World as Will and 
Idea, where it is used to structure the dialectical construction of his Idealist 
reality. Schopenhauer establishes the foundation of his world upon a radi-
cal declaration of subjectivism in the tradition of Descartes and Kant: “The 
world is my idea”—that is to mean, the world is merely a phenomenon of the 
subjective mind. In the beginning, Schopenhauer’s Idealism is even more 
strict than Kant’s, denying Kant’s things-in-themselves, the individual 
objects behind the phenomena. Every object presupposes a perceiving 
2 On the other hand, Juan Arana does not consider the reading of philosophy as fan-
tastic literature to be a critique of philosophy, but rather a suggestion that both philoso-
phy and literature, as products of human thought, are equally worthwhile (173). But the 
consistently ironic attitude that Borges adopts towards philosophy, and towards Ideal-














subject, and therefore the object can only be “idea,” a phenomenal 
construction of the subject (27).3 For Schopenhauer, that which can 
be perceived is idea, and that which cannot be perceived is unknowable. 
What cannot be known cannot exist; as an example, he tries paradoxically 
to imagine the phenomenal world independent of a perceiving subject, 
realizing that the very thought becomes “nothing but the process in the 
intellect of the knowing subject who is perceiving an objective world, and 
so it is the very thing we had wanted to exclude” (14). As with “Schopen-
hauer’s circle,” this proof that the unknowable is non-existent involves a 
self-referential step that roots the argument upon there being a mind who 
demands the proof; for Schopenhauer, logic never exists in a void, but is 
always and inextricably bound to a subjective logician.
Yet the subject’s own existence also seems to be under attack by this 
very principle. Although Schopenhauer’s tenet that “there can never be 
an absolute and independent existence” (14) is applied to refute the Kan-
tian object, it must apply to the subject as well. Schopenhauer rejects what 
he calls “theoretical egoism,” essentially solipsism, in which the subject 
“holds all phenomena, excepting its own individual self, to be phantoms” 
(37). Although this view cannot be disproved, it is also not a useful philo-
sophical argument, since nothing else could be known except for the fact 
that the knowing subject is thinking. But by rejecting theoretical egoism, 
Schopenhauer is assuming the existence of something outside of the sub-
ject-object dichotomy: this thing-in-itself he calls the Will.
The Will is first abstracted from the actions of the body: apart from 
constructing ideas from phenomenal data, the knowing subject also acts, 
and this inner force that propels action is one aspect of the Will, and the 
subject’s acting body is “the objectivity of [that] will” (35). Schopenhauer 
then extends this description of the body, as simultaneously idea and Will, 
to every other object in the material world, including inanimate objects; 
thus all natural forces, like magnetism, electricity, and gravity, are mani-
festations of Will (42). Logically, this assumption that all movement is 
governed by Will can now be applied back onto the actions of the subject; 
his actions cannot be free, since “the individual, the person, is not Will 
as a thing-in-itself, but is a phenomenon of Will, and as such is already 








determined and has entered into the form of the phenomenal” (45). By 
combining the two propositions, the world as idea and the world as Will, 
Schopenhauer has closed the narrative loop of the text; the first subject 
—the narrator at the beginning who states, “The world is my idea”—is 
himself merely an idea.
Borges uses a similar logical structure to drive many of his stories. The 
dreamer in “Las ruinas circulares” most transparently mirrors the narrator 
in The World as Will and Idea. He arrives in the ruins with a goal: “Quería 
soñar un hombre: quería soñarlo con integridad minuciosa e imponerlo 
a la realidad” (Ficciones 72). His dreams are “dialectical,” reflecting Scho-
penhauer’s use of dialectical reasoning to construct his own world. The 
dreamed man is identical to a real man in every way, except in being im-
pervious to fire. When, at the end of the story, the ruins are engulfed in 
flames, the dreamer is not burnt, and he realizes that “él también era una 
apariencia, que otro estaba soñándolo” (81), just as Schopenhauer’s nar-
rator realizes that the perceiving subject is but a phenomenon.
Both The World as Will and Idea and “Las ruinas circulares” are texts 
that are logically structured to double back on themselves. In reference to 
Borges’s work, Lem calls this technique unitas oppositorum, “the unity of 
mutually exclusive opposites” (239), as in the unity of the dreamer and 
the dreamed man. But this technique could also be called dialectical syn-
thesis, as when Schopenhauer unites the subject and the object, Will and 
idea. The consequence in both cases of this narrative logic that closes in on 
itself is that it creates a discursive world that is removed from the reader’s 
reality. John Sturrock compares Borges’s fictions to Schopenhauer’s phi-
losophy by seeing them both as closed worlds:
Idealism, which holds that mental phenomena are all we can ever know 
of reality since whatever lies beyond them is by definition unknowable, 
offers him... everything... The Idealism of Berkeley and Schopenhauer is 
seamless; it is a pure mentalism. Whatever may or may not lie outside the 
limits of consciousness, the troublesome Thing-in-Itself is left to itself. In 
Schopenhauer the Real is reintroduced not in the service of some hypo-
thetical matter but as the inconceivable noumenon or Will, of which all 
that we can perceive is the objectification. (22-23)
Borges’s worlds, like Idealism, are independent of any supposition of an 














ject and the author to the unknowable Will, whose manifestation, the 
text, is all that is available to the reader (23). Ana Sierra similarly notes 
the distance that Borges creates between his Idealist worlds and the real 
world, describing his fictions as “una realidad discursiva que declara su 
autonomía de la realidad fenoménica” (36). Like Schopenhauer’s ideas, 
Borges’s fictions cannot convey the essence of the real, and Sierra suggests 
that he uses the recurring motifs of mirrors and the double to emphasize 
that his conceptual narratives are, as abstractions of reality, merely images 
(40).
If both Borges’s fictional worlds and The World as Will and Idea are 
discursive realities that close in upon themselves and exist independently 
from the reader’s reality, how can we distinguish between fiction on the 
one hand and Idealist philosophy on the other? One common approach 
is to try and give a general definition of each term; however, this is natu-
rally a fraught enterprise, and, in the case of Borges, the definitions often 
align with whether or not a particular scholar wishes to portray him as a 
philosopher (see Johnson, 11 onwards). On the other hand, some schol-
ars reject the distinction between the two. Lem, for example, sees no dif-
ference between them except a nominal one; he writes, “If Schopenhauer 
had never existed, and if Borges presented to us the ontological doctrine 
of ‘The World as Will,’ we would never accept it as a philosophical system 
that must be taken seriously; we would take it as an example of a ‘fantas-
tic philosophy.’ As soon as nobody assents to it, a philosophy becomes 
automatically fantastic literature” (237 note). This hypothesis also has its 
correlative: if people began to accept fantastic literature as a philosophi-
cal description of the world, would it automatically become real? Borges 
asks this question in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” where a fictional world, 
Tlön, in which Idealism governs “su lenguaje y las derivaciones de su 
lenguaje –la religión, las letras, la metafísica” (Ficciones 16), slowly begins 
to encroach upon the real world. The narrator anticipates the complete 
overtaking of the real world by the fictional as people become more and 
more amenable to the rigorous Idealism of Tlön. But the narrator never 
lets the reader forget that Tlön is a product of human creativity, and that 
the rigour of Idealism is “un rigor de ajedrecistas, no de ángeles” (37). As 
Alejandro Riberi points out, an Ideal world such as Tlön is not meant as 







logically-consistent construction is a result of the suppression of the com-
plexities of reality (218). Lem is partially correct in asserting that the reader 
ultimately decides whether a text is philosophic or fantastic, but, at least 
in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” there are clear indications that Borges is 
emphasizing the space between his rigorously logical worlds and the real 
world.
Yet, the very act of narration bridges this space. Even if they are closed 
worlds, both Borges’s fictions and Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and 
Idea are still texts; they are inevitably connected to the “real” world, that is, 
the reader’s world, simply by their being read. Every hypothetical world 
intersects the phenomenal world by way of the reader; this is how Scho-
penhauer can write about his noumenal Will, however unknowable it is. 
How do the two writers compare in their strategies for bridging the world 
of the reader and the logically impenetrable world of their text?
Despite the claim by James E. Irby that Borges’s essays are indistin-
guishable from his fictions (Agassi 288), there seems to be a definitive dif-
ference in the way the narrator is considered. In “Las ruinas circulares,” 
the question of how a self-contained world that is autonomous from the 
reader’s reality can be narrated is never answered—how can one narrate 
from within a dream? The narrator is an invisible but omnipresent bridge 
between the discursive world of the text and the world of the reader. But in 
the essay “Nueva refutación del tiempo,” the narrator’s reality is one that 
can clearly be shared with the reader; the text does not loop back on itself 
to become a self-contained, Ideal world, even if the text itself describes 
such an idealism. Borges ends the work thus:
And yet, and yet... Negar la sucesión temporal, negar el yo, negar el universo 
astronómico, son desesperaciones aparentes y consuelos secretos... El 
tiempo es un río que me arrebata, pero yo soy el río; es un tigre que me 
destroza, pero yo soy el tigre; es un fuego que me consume, pero yo soy 
el fuego. El mundo, desgraciadamente, es real; yo, desgraciadamente, soy 
Borges. (Otras inquisiciones 114)
Silva G. Dapía, in reading this passage, focuses on the identity of time with 
the self, and understands Borges to be “denying the boundaries between 
the self and the universe,” which, as she notes, is equivalent to denying 
the self (147). But this would be ignoring the broader import of the 














ends, powerfully, with a melancholic affirmation of self. Idealism, here, 
seems to be a means of escape from the world to a realm of possible 
worlds; however, the storyteller himself must bear the burden of remain-
ing Earth-bound in order to narrate those worlds to others.
The World as Will and Idea is, like one of Borges’s hypothetical worlds, 
a closed system. The single thing-in-itself that unites all phenomena, pre-
sumably also uniting the reader as perceiving subject with the text as ob-
ject, is the Will, which can never be known directly. By Schopenhauer’s 
own strict logic, the imperceptible Will could not exist; yet paradoxically, 
not only can it be talked about, but it is the only thing that exists, of which 
everything else is only an objectification. In addressing this contradiction, 
Schopenhauer articulates the relationship between the discursive reality 
of his text and the reality of the reader:
I should be equally misunderstood by anyone who might think that it 
is all the same in the end whether we designate this inner nature of all 
phenomena as will or call it by any other name. This would be the case 
if that thing-in-itself were something whose existence we merely inferred, 
and thus known only indirectly and only in the abstract. Then, indeed, we 
might call it what we pleased; the name would stand merely as the symbol 
of an unknown quantity. But the word will, which, like a magic spell [Zau-
berwort], is to reveal to us the essence of everything in nature... something 
that is in every way immediately recognized and so familiar to us that we 
know and understand what will is far better than anything else. (43)
Iván Almeida notes that the Will cannot be known by perception or rea-
soning, but rather by intuition alone (117); while perception and rea-
soning are ruled out, it is not precisely intuition that is being described 
here, but rather revelation. In fact, in this passage, Schopenhauer clearly 
defines the relationship between the reader’s own experience and the 
closed world of the text: it is pure magic. If we use the fictions and essays 
of Borges as a spectrum to reflect on Schopenhauer, we must situate The 
World as Will and Idea definitively on the side of fiction.
We might compare Schopenhauer’s magic spell to the divine sentence 
sought by Tzinacán in Borges’s story “La escritura del Dios,” in order to 
better understand the implications of such magic. In human language, 
signs are dual, composed of signifier and signified. The signifier is conven-
tionally understood as a substitute for the signified, and often a poor sub-







But the utterance that Tzinacán seeks is absolute—an utterance that does 
not merely represent reality, but that must be identical to reality. Logically, 
just as in Schopenhauer’s Welt als Wille, the whole world would merely be 
a phenomenon, merely “sombras o simulacros” of that divine utterance 
(El Aleph 161). When Tzinacán finally comes to comprehend it, he realizes 
that he has had to transcend his own self, since even the self was only a 
phenomenon of the real. With that final surrender, the world is reduced 
to the word, to a monistic whole. Schopenhauer similarly posits reality to 
be non-dual, declaring that subject and object, self and other to be one; in 
The World as Will and Idea, there is a single subject who is simultaneously 
the narrator and the narrated object.
Tzinacán’s method of perceiving the Real is similar to Schopenhauer’s 
faculty of aesthetic experience—both require the complete renunciation 
of one’s individuality. According to Schopenhauer, a reader, rather than 
subjectively perceiving, must objectively perceive—that is, to perceive 
“not as individual, but as pure will-less subject of knowledge” (119). We 
might apply this method of reading in order to break in to the closed dis-
cursive reality of The World as Will and Idea. As Lem notes, such a rigorously 
logical system is as impossible to penetrate, rationally, as the theoretical 
egoism that Schopenhauer rejects: “To refute them, it would not be suffi-
cient merely to show their absurd consequences. To refute them, it would 
be necessary to call into question the total syntax of human thought, and 
thinking in its ontological dimensions” (238). This is precisely what, in 
Schopenhauer’s terms, the “genius” does in order to break in to Schopen-
hauer’s circle; he has
the capacity for knowing independently of the principle of sufficient rea-
son, and hence for knowing not individual things (which have their ex-
istence only in their relations) but the Ideas of such things, and of being 
in relation to these things oneself the correlative of the Idea, and thus no 
longer an individual, but the pure subject of knowing. (118)
The reader, then, must similarly become a “pure subject of knowing” and 
cast off his dualistic modes of thinking. Again, Schopenhauer refers to 
this transcendence of individuality as a sort of magic, and as soon as one 
relapses into duality, “the magic is at an end” (122). But while the perceiv-
ing subject is renouncing his individuality, “as pure subject of knowledge, 














objects… The world as idea alone remains, and the world as will has dis-
appeared” (122-23). This World as Idea is the same impenetrable discur-
sive reality that Schopenhauer constructs in the first two books, in which 
the perceiving subject is simultaneously also the idea. For Schopenhauer, 
the realization of this reality is the aesthetic experience, and the only way 
for the reader to enter the discursive reality of The World as Will and Idea 
is to renounce his own individuality and to become the first subject who 
declares, “The world is my idea.”4
“La escritura del Dios,” on the other hand, ends with a curious dual-
ity; Tzinacán, still self-conscious, still narrating in first-person, distances 
himself from Tzinacán, el otro who had obtained the divine utterance: “Ese 
hombre ha sido él y ahora no le importa. Qué le importa la suerte de aquel 
otro, qué le importa la nación de aquel otro, si él, ahora es nadie. Por eso 
no pronuncio la fórmula, por eso dejo que me olviden los días, acostado 
en la oscuridad” (165). The Tzinacán who has shed his sense of self in 
order to reach the divine has become no one, but, simultaneously and par-
adoxically, he has also become an other for Tzinacán the narrator. Just as 
Borges does in “Nueva refutación del tiempo,” Tzinacán pulls back from 
the edge at the last minute; in fact, this is what makes it possible for him 
to tell his story. An entity that has achieved unity with the universe does 
not have the necessary dualistic framework to even conceive of narrative.5 
Similarly, in “Las ruinas circulares,” the dreamer is also a dreamed man, 
but he is not necessarily the same dreamed man that his dreams beget; 
in fact, at the end of the story, the dreamer realizes that otro, an other, is 
dreaming him. Even in his fictions, Borges does not completely close off 
the narrative world to create an impenetrable, monistic whole; he allows 
a bridge between the reader and the text, the bare minimum assumption 
of self and other. Borges uses the structures of narrative and therefore 
of our own phenomenal reality—time, space, causality, individuality—
and re-configures them to create hypothetical worlds that the reader can 
hold as a mirror to his own world. He doesn’t deny reality; in fact, he 
4 In a similar vein, Borges ends “Nueva refutación del tiempo” with this quote from 
Angelus Silesius: “Go and yourself become the text, yourself the essence” (trans. Dapía 
147).
5 This is also what the narrator in “El Aleph” realizes: “¿cómo transmitir a los otros el 







considers a fiction as “un plano ideal” that intersects reality (Otras inquisi-
ciones 29). The real world of the reader and the discursive world of the text 
are mediated by the narrator, by (non-magical) words, even by the occa-
sional reminder that, however attractively logical an Ideal world is, it is 
the construction of a human mind. On the other hand, The World as Will 
and Idea, as a discursive world, is a unique fiction. It slowly erodes and, 
by the fourth book, eventually does away with time, space, causality and 
individuality. Moreover, it does not present itself as an ideal plane that 
intersects the reader’s reality; it demands itself as a replacement for the 
reader’s reality.6 Consequently, Sturrock’s reading of the reader as perceiv-
ing subject and the text as an objectification of the author’s Will is decid-
edly too superficial; the reader, too, is merely a phenomenon of the Will. 
Schopenhauer’s world is more “perverse” than any of Borges’s because 
it draws the reader into its irrefutably logical conclusions: idea and Will, 
subject and object, reader and text are all eventually unified. His initial 
statement that theoretical egoism, if it were a serious conviction, “could 
be found only in a madhouse” (37) is attractively realistic, but as the text 
pushes onwards, madness is increasingly praised; in the third book, the 
madman is compared to the genius in the way in which he “accurately rec-
ognizes discrete elements in the present, and also in the past, but that he 
mistakes the connection, the relationship of one thing to another” (117). 
This is precisely the same faculty that allows the genius to cast off the prin-
ciples of sufficient reason and become a “pure subject of knowing.” By 
the fourth book, it is not only the madman and the genius who discard 
the relationship of events in time; future and past “exist only in concept” 
(118), and only the present really exists.
But Schopenhauer goes even further, taking the opposite position 
from the Borges of “Nueva refutación del tiempo”; to deny time itself is 
not merely a secret consolation, but a natural and logical step in his dis-
course. Borges, in his stories, compares the world to a dream; for Scho-
penhauer, the world finally is a dream, and consequently void. In the third 
book, the reader had to deny the Will and his own autonomy in order to 
6 This is the very opposite of what Borges wishes to achieve: “Il y a des gens qui croient 
que j’écris ces contes comme des fables, disons, pour convaincre quelqu’un. Ce n’est pas 
ça. Je crois que j’ai pensé à l’irréalité du monde comme à des sujets utilisables par la litté-














gain access to a world of pure ideas, but even this aesthetic experience is 
only an illusion (122). By denying the Will, one denies all ideas, since they 
are all merely phenomena of the Will:
with the free denial, the surrender of the will, all those phenomena are 
also suspended… all the grades of objectivity… the varieties of forms suc-
ceeding one another in gradation… and finally, also its universal form 
of this manifestation, time and space, and also its ultimate fundamental 
form, subject and object—all are suspended. No will: no idea, no world. 
(261)
In the previous three books, Schopenhauer went to great lengths to unify 
the perceiving subject and the object, the reader and the text. The reader, 
by casting off his individuality, “becomes one” with the text, existing in 
the World as Idea. But by finally denying all ideas, Schopenhauer denies 
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